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Abstract
Out-of-pocket spending is the most unequal and inefficient way to fund health care. Nevertheless, it is widely 
spread across Latin-American countries, accounting in Chile for more than 40% of total health spending in the
2000s. Focusing on chronic conditions associated with lifestyle, we estimated the marginal impact of
epidemiological characteristics of households on out-of-pocket health spending. To do so, we use two
nationally-urban representative surveys and multivariate analysis. The number of chronic conditions, health 
care use, household income and insurance type were associated with out-of-pocket spending. Likewise, lower-
middle income individuals with chronic diseases and their families are particularly exposed to these 
payments. 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 
Organising Committee of ICOAE 2012
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1. Introduction
Out-of-pocket spending (OPS) is the most unequal and inefficient way to fund health care, however it is 
widely spread across developed and developing countries (Wagstaff et al., 1989, 1999; WHO, 2010b; Xu, 
2003). In 2007 (the latest year for which homogeneous data are available), it was the most important source of 
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financing for health care in 33 countries and it represented more than a fourth of total health spending in other 
75 (WHO, 2010). 
In Chile, OPS is the most important source of income for health care finance. Between 2000 and 2010,
43% of total health spending came from users fees. Although public spending on health has grown steadily
over the past two decades, the contribution of families through direct payments remains high, both in the 
public and private insurance. This significantly increases the risk of catastrophic expenditures in case of 
illness.
Economic theory suggests that relying on OPS to finance health care tends to diminish resources for 
economic development (Cutler 1995; Frenck et al. 1994; Frenck et al., 2003). Similarly, several research have 
shown that OPS is the most unequal way to fund health care, which increase or deepen poverty (Frenk et al.,
1994; Rice 1992, Rice and Morrison, 1994 and Russell et al., 1994, WHO, 2000, Xu et al., 2003). It is also an 
inefficient funding mechanism since it does not allow risk pooling and brings about untargeted implicit 
subsidies (Baeza and Cabeza, 1998; Manning and Marquis, 1996, PAHO, 1999).
National health reforms to improve fairness of financial contribution have not been successful. Chilean 
families spend 6.7% of their non-subsistence effective income to cover the costs of health care, in addition to 
the contribution through payroll deductions and general taxes. The spending burden across income groups is
regressive, since the lower-middle income groups devote a higher share of their income compared with 
higher-income groups.
According to the literature, seven groups of factors explain OPS at the micro level. Socioeconomic status, 
insurance type, and certain household characteristics have received greater attention. Conversely, it is difficult 
to find works that study the relationship between the epidemiological profile of individuals and the trend to 
devote resources to health care. Data constraints and the presence of potentially endogenous explanatory 
variables hinder statistical modelling.
In spite of this, it is necessary to approach the epidemiological determinants of OPS. In the case of Chile, 
the II National Health Survey (2010) reveals that lower income groups are particularly exposed to chronic 
non-communicable diseases (CND). Thus, improving the standards of financial protection in the Chilean 
health care system is even more difficult to achieve.
Focusing on CND associated with lifestyle, we estimated the impact of epidemiological characteristics of
households on out-of-pocket health spending. To do so, we used two nationally urban representative surveys 
(National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey and Household Budget Survey) and multivariate analysis.
Since expenditure is conditional upon illness, we first identified determinants of reporting CND, using a 
logistic choice discrete model. Then, we estimated determinants of the resulting expenditure.
The paper is structured as follows: in section two we reviewed the main findings provide by the economic 
theory and applied economics on the determinants of out-pocket-spending on health. Section three describes 
the methodology while section four contains the results. The study ends with a discussion of the main results.
2. What do we know on the determinants of out-of-pocket health care spending?
Economic theory suggests that the demand for medical care is derived from the individual demand for
health (Grossman, 1972). It also suggests that uncertainty is an intrinsic characteristic due to the uncertainty 
over the incidence of illness. On the other hand, we know that rational individuals are utility-maximizers, so 
in a situation of illness, they will demand medical care (Grossman, 1972; Wagstaff, 1986). Moreover, risk-
averse individuals will be willing to demand health care in a preventive manner. In these circumstances,
rational individuals focus on how much health care to demand... subject, of course, to a resource constraint.
So, in practice, the most important economic decision is how much to pay for health care services.
Assuming that rational individuals will be willing to demand health care, what circumstances will lead 
them to do so? According to the latest available evidence, there are seven determinants of household health 
expenditure. There is a statistically significant positive correlation with household income (Chaze, 2005; 
Hjorstberg 2003; Okunade et al. 2009; Parker and Wong 1997, Rous and Hotchkiss 2003; Rubin and Koelln 
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1993; Sesma 2006; Torres and Knaul 2003), and with age, although the latter is conceptualized differently in 
different studies: age of household head, average age of the household, age of respondent, among others 
(Okunade et al. 2009; Rubin and Koelln 1993; Sesma 2006; Torres and Knaul 2003).
The insurance type also shows a statistically significant correlation, although evidence is not conclusive on 
the sign of the relationship. In Mexico, Parker and Wong (1997) found a positive correlation in the absence of 
insurance, an issue which is confirmed by subsequent studies (Sesma, 2006; Knaul Torres 2003). In Zambia, 
insurance tends to reduce the impact of family health spending (Hjorstberg, 2003), while in South Korea, the 
impact of OPS tends to be lower among families insured in the public system. Instead, in the U.S. the 
magnitude of cost-sharing is higher among insured families (Rubin and Koelln, 1993).
There is no agreement either concerning the relationship between OPS and the status of housing location: 
urban or rural (Hjorstberg 2003, Rous and Hotchkiss, 2003, Torres and Knaul, 2003).
Certain characteristics of the household head, such as age, gender and instruction level are also correlated
to the magnitude of OPS. Households headed by older individuals use to bear a lower burden (Rous and 
Hotchkiss, 2003). While households headed by women are just the opposite (Okunade et al, 2009; Rubin and 
Koelln, 1993). The relationship with the instruction level of household head is also positive, according to
Okunade et al. (2009), Rubin and Koelln (1993) and Su et al. (2006).
Household size and certain housing infrastructures also explain the incidence of OPS. Okunade et al.
(2009), Rous and Hotchkiss (2003), and Torres and Knaul (2003) concluded that the first variable has a 
positive effect, while the availability of drains, sewers, and drinking water tend to reduce these payments
(Rous and Hotchkiss, 2003; Torres and Knaul, 2003).
Evidence regarding the effects of type of illness and perceived severity of illness is less frequent and little 
attention has been given to the impact of epidemiologic risk factors. Household surveys used to carry out
these analyses -living conditions surveys or household budgets surveys, do not provide regular information on 
morbidity. On the other hand, endogeneity is another problem of potential problems which need to be 
controlled in the modelling of health care expenditure. Nevertheless, studies by Hjortsberg (2003), Huang et 
al. (2001), Ruger and Kim (2007) and Su et al. (2006) are worth noting.
Huang et al. (2001) found that household health expenditure increases with the number of CND affecting
an individual, though it does marginally. Similarly, health expenditure on drugs tends to be higher among
individuals with chronic illness, regardless their age. Chronic diseases also raise expenditure on dental care
services and professional health services. Ruger and Kim (2007) concluded that health care spending
increases as personal income reduces and the number of chronic conditions grows. However, for countries of
low and very low human development, the evidence is not conclusive. Whilst Hjortsberg (2003) did find
evidence of a positive correlation between the demand for health care and non-communicable diseases in
Zambia, Su et al. 2006 was unable to confirm this.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data
Data came from two nationally representative surveys: the National Socioeconomic Characterization 
Survey (CASEN09) and the Household Budget Survey (EPF07). Both are part of the Integrated Household 
Survey Programme performed by the Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE).
The former is a cross-sectional survey of living conditions applied to a sample of over 56,000 urban 
households. In addition to provide information on socioeconomic conditions, it includes statistics on the type 
of health insurance as well as access and utilization of health services. From 2006, the survey include
information on the reported prevalence of some CND considered economically catastrophic by the Chilean 
Health Ministry, but only CASEN09 provides disaggregated data by type of pathology. EPF07 is a survey of 
income and expenditure applied to a sample of 10,000 urban households.
In order to estimate the determinants of OPS, CASEN was complemented with data on the structure of 
household expenditure. To do so, we ran a statistical matching procedure that led to a new database with 
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variables from both files. The integration of data was carried out observation by observation, matching those 
variables with similar characteristics and using a merger variable common to both samples, which enabled to 
preserve the distribution of the variables of interest. The main sample was CASEN09 and the complementary 
sample was EPF07. The merger variable was monetary income, defined as the sum of income from labour and 
in-cash transfers from the public sector. Finally, a sample with the basic features of CASEN09 was obtained,
though with higher quality in the structure of households’ expenditure.
3.2 Modelling
The demand for health care has been described as a process in successive stages by Hjorstberg (2003) and
Su et al. (2006): sick individuals -or their families, make the decision to require medical care when health
fails. If the decision is positive, individuals spend money to finance the costs of health care. Thus, to have an 
unbiased estimate of OPS determinants, in a previous step, it should be estimated the probability that 
individuals or families demand health care. In other word, the distribution of health care expenditure is 
conditional upon the household decision to demand health care.
In a first step, we estimated the probability that families demand medical care due to CNDs. Then, we 
estimated the magnitude of household expenditures associated with catastrophic chronic diseases, by 
including as a regressor a selection term derived from the first step.
3.2.1 Estimation of the probability of health care demand
We used a binomial logistic model (BNL) to know the epidemiological and socioeconomic characteristics 
that lead a household to demand health care due to CNDs. Each household faced the following alternatives: 
having received medical care in the presence of a group of diseases or not having received medical care. In 
this situation, for each household i the dependent variable could take only two values: Yi = (0,1), depending 
on whether the household fell into the first or the second alternative. Receiving medical care was a function of 
variables that characterized each household and they were denoted by Xi, adding an error term that explained
the differences between observed values of Yi (zero or one) and their predicted values. In our model, we 
defined Yi = 1 (TREAT = 1) if a household member had received medical care during the last year, and Yi = 0 
(TREAT = 0) otherwise.
Probability of making a choice concerning the demand for health care due to CNDs was written as 
follows:
(1)
, where Yi = 1 indicated the household i having received health care due to chronic diseases. Į was a set of 
parameters to be estimated, and Zi was a set of explanatory variables denoting an array of household’s
characteristics, intake habits, socioeconomic status, and insurance type.
The model was tested for misspecification using a Ramsey RESET-test while goodness-of-fit was assessed 
performing the Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
3.2.2 Estimating the determinants of out-of-pocket health spending
The determinants of OPS were estimated by multivariate analysis using OLS. The estimate was subject to 
the demand for medical care. This model, developed by Lee (1983) and used by Hjorstberg (2003) and Su et
al. (2006) in the field of Health Economics, assumes the existence of two variables Y1 (= ȕ; + İ1) and Y2 (=
Į= + İ2), such that Y1 is only observed if Y2> 0. This way, the dependent variable is Y = Y1 if Y2> 0. X and Z
are vectors of explanatory variables, while İ1 and İ2 are the error terms. Į and ȕ are parameters to be 
estimated. In this case, Y = Y1 represents household OPS associated with the demand for health care due to 
CNDs, while Y2 is the prone to demand health care due to CNDs. It is important to note that Y2 is not 
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observable, but only its sign (Y2>0 if Y is observed, and Y2 if Y is not observed). The equation had the 
following form:
(2)
, ZKHUHĭLVWKHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQIXQFWLRQĳLVWKHFXPXODWLYHGHQVLW\IXQFWLRQıLVWKHYDULDQFHRI
İ1, DQGȡLVWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQİ1 DQGİ2. Thus:
(3)
$Vȡı, the latter term corrects the sample selection bias so the pocket health spending is modelled as 
follows:
(4)
ZKHUHȜ >ĳĮ= ĭĮ=@LVthe WHUPRIVHOHFWLRQDQGĬ ȡıLVLWVFRHIILFLHQW7KHVHOHFWLRQWHUPȜ
was GHULYHG IURP WKH ELQDU\ PRGHO WKDW HVWLPDWHG WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI GHPDQGLQJ KHDOWK FDUH 7KH WHUP Ȝ
ensures FRQVLVWHQWHVWLPDWHVRIȕDQGĬ
In this second stage, out-of-pocket health expenditure was a function of variables denoting a set of 
household characteristics, health status, socioeconomic status, and insurance type. We use interactive 
variables in order to control by economic status and insurance type.
We verified the correct functional specification of the model performing the RESET Ramsey test. The 
presence of heteroscedasticity was observed by Cook- Weisberg test. 
Logistic and linear regressions were all made using STATA 9.2 for Windows. The usual significance level
was established (5%).
3.3 Variables and measurement 
Table 2 summarizes dependent and independent variables as well as their measurement:
Table 1 List of variables
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT
1. Dependent variables
TREAT Medical care=1; otherwise=0
OPS Out-of-pocket health spending (log)
2. Independent variables
Household characteristics
AGE Age of head of household (log)
EDUC Education of head of household (log)
SIZE Household size (log)
MALE Gender of head of household: male=1; female=0
Intake habits
HEALTHY_INTAKE Healthy food spending as a % of total food spending
UNHEALTHY_ INTAKE Unhealthy food and tobacco spending as a % of total food spending
Health status
CND Nº of non-communicable chronic diseases in household
HOSPITAL Nº of inpatient hospital days in the last 12 months
OUTPATIENT Nº of outpatient control visits 
Econonic status
NSI Household effective non-subsistence income (log)
Q1 Q1=1 household falling into quintile 1, 0= otherwise
Q2 Q2=1 household falling into quintile 2, 0= otherwise
Q3 Q3=1 household falling into quintile 3, 0= otherwise
Q4 Q4=1 household falling into quintile 4; 0= otherwise
Insurance¥
PUBLIC Public health insurance (YES=1; otherwise=0)
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Lambda Selection term
Q5: reference group; ¥PRIVATE: reference group
TREAT was a dummy variable denoting whether a household member had received medical care during 
the last 12 months due to a CND or not.
OPS quantified out-of-pocket spending and included extraordinary expenditures by a household to cover 
the cost of the following items: medication and drugs, ancillary supplies (cotton, alcohol, ...), medical aids
(dentures, hearing aids, eye glasses, ...), professional health services, hospitalization, and health insurance
premiums other than extraordinary quotes to the mandatory health insurance plan.
Two variables approached households’ intake habits. HEALTHY_INTAKE was the spending on foods 
that are the richest sources of many of the essential nutrients needed for optimal health as a share of 
subsistence spending. UNHEALTHY_INTAKE was the spending on calorie-dense nutrient-poor foods,
tobacco and alcohol as a share of subsistence spending. We defined subsistence spending as total expenditure 
spent on food.
Variables approaching the health status of households included three regressors. CND was the number of 
chronic illnesses present in the household. Pathologies selected showed three characteristics: they were non-
communicable chronic diseases; they were associated with lifestyle; and they were considered economically 
catastrophic. OUTPATIENT approached the number of outpatient control visits, and HOSPITAL the number 
of days of hospitalization during the past year. We chose the number of days instead of spending to avoid 
simultaneous causality bias.
Socioeconomic status of household was approached by the effective non-subsistence income (ENI), a 
common measure of households’ ability-to-pay. It is the income remaining to the household after paying for 
basic needs such as food. In addition, the model included qualitative variables denoting income quintile.
Finally, PUBLIC was a dummy variable denoting whether a household was covered by the public health 
insurance or not.
4. Results
4.1 Household health care spending 
Chilean families spend 5.4% of their total income to finance health care, in addition to the contribution 
through payroll deductions and general taxes. This is the sixth component of household expenditure. By
components, outlays to fund professional health services equal 39% of total household’s health expenditure, 
followed by spending on medicine and drugs (31%), and spending on inpatient hospitalization (17%).
Table 2 Out-of-pocket expenditure by components
COMPONENTS OF SPENDING Q_1 Q_2 Q_3 Q_4 Q_5 TOTAL
Medicines and drugs 37,92% 33,66% 30,38% 33,44% 31,60% 32,32%
Ancilliery and medical supplies 3,78 3,00 1,87 2,62 1,50 2,04
Prosthesis, orthosis, and medical aids 10,28 9,77 10,13 10,36 7,84 9,00
Professional health services 28,84 40,62 36,99 35,09 42,02 39,01
Inpatient hospitalization 19,02 12,96 20,54 18,08 16,27 17,14
Health insurance (non-mandatory) 0,16 0,00 0,13 0,41 0,78 0,51
TOTAL OPS 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: own elaboration
Focusing on OPS by components and controlling by household income we found clear signs of inequality 
in health financing, as virtually no component is distributed according to the ability-to-pay principle. Indeed, 
drug expenditure tends to be regressive, as shown in Table 3.
Although national health systems are not expected to make income distribution, there is a widespread 
consensus on the need for fairness in health financing. In practice, financial burdens must be distributed 
according to the individuals/households’ ability-to-pay; and exposure to financially catastrophic losses must 
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be avoid or reduce (Murray, 2000; WHO 2000, 2010a; Xu et al. 2005).
In order to assess the financial fairness of the Chilean health care system, we first assessed the incidence
of OPS in terms of household’s ability-to-pay, approached by the effective non-subsistence income (ENI). In 
Table 4, the burden on ENI is compared to the burden on disposable income which allows a better 
understanding of the welfare loss in households as a result of OPS. Focusing on OPS as a percentage of total 
household expenditure (proxy for income) we noted that this burden is progressively distributed. Although 
households in the richest quintile bear the highest burden, households in the third quintile spend a higher share
of their total income in health care than households in the fourth quintile. On the other hand, we find that OPS 
burden in the two lowest income quintiles is virtually the same.
Table 3 OPS burden and impact on households’ welfare
Income quintiles OPS burden on
disposable income
OPS burden 
on ENI
Variation of the impact
on household’s  welfare
Q_1 4,32% 6,55% 51,62%
Q_2 4,30% 6,06% 40,93%
Q_3 5,41% 7,27% 34,38%
Q_4 5,33% 6,73% 26,27%
Q_5 5,85% 6,66% 13,85%
Mean 5,41% 6,70% 23,84%
Source: own elaboration
OPS as a percentage of households’ effective non-subsistence income equal 6.7%. Once again, this burden 
is not progressively distributed: the poorest households (Q_1) sacrifice a similar share of their ENI than the
richest households (Q_5); third and fourth quintiles bear a heavier burden than the fifth quintile; and the 
heaviest burden on ENI is borne by the third quintile (6,7% of average ENI).
An important issue regarding fairness in health care financing has to do with households’ loss of welfare 
as a result of OPS. In the third column of Table 3, we can see that the household effort increases in all 
quintiles as we rely on ENI instead of disposable income. Though this is an expected result, we can further 
note that the loss of welfare associated with households’ effort increase as the ENI declines, and is fairly 
higher in the poorest families.
4.2 Estimation results
The logistic model results show that the probability of receiving medical care due to the prevalence of CNDs
increased with age and education level of household head. The consumption of unhealthy food, alcohol and 
tobacco increased the risk of requiring medical attention for this reason. However, healthy intake habits did
not seem to reduce the probability of requiring health care. Households with higher income were more willing 
to demand medical care when facing NCDs associated with lifestyle. As for insurance type, being covered by 
the public system positively affects the probability of seeking care. Table 5 shows coefficients of probability 
for the logistic regression model.
Table 5 Estimated coefficients in logistic model for seeking care due to NCD (n=56,000)
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ROBUST SE
AGE 0.017 0.012*
EDUC 0.175 0.064*
SIZE -0.068 0.019*
GENDER (male) -0.910 0.910
HEALTHY_INTAKE -0.083 0.093
UNHEALTHY_ INTAKE 0.097 0.060**
NSI 0.071 0.057*
PUBLIC¥ 0.254 0.093*
Constant 0.017 0.012*
¥PRIVATE: reference group. *Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05. Log Likelihood: -14,429. LR chi2: 279.54 (p<0.001). Pseudo
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R2: 0.065. Ramsey RESET: 2.57(8) (p=0.07). Hosmer Lemeshow: 14.79(8) (p=0.08).
Results from the multivariate regression analysis shown that OPS rose with education level of household 
head, and the number of CNDs. While size of household and age of household reduced these payments, just 
the former was significant. As for health status characteristics, all the variables increased OPS. The number of 
outpatient visits had the greatest impact followed by the number of CND. Regarding the economic status of 
households, those belonging to Q2, Q3 and Q4 spent more than households in the richest quintile (Q5), while 
falling in Q1 reduced the magnitude of OPS. In comparison to private health insurance, belonging to the 
public system did not reduce the impact of family health spending. Finally as the coefficient of the selection 
WHUP Ȝ was significant, bias estimates of out-of-pocket health expenditure were discarded. Table 6 shows 
coefficients of determination for the multivariate regression model:
Table 6 Out-of-pocket health expenditure. OLS results (n=8,568)
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ROBUST SE
AGE 1.046 0.817
EDUC 0.175 0.122*
SIZE -0.051 0.006*
GENDER (male) -0.158 0.108
NCD 0.215 0.115*
HOSPITAL 0.195 0.061*
OUTPATIENT 0.276 0.147**
lnNSI 0.064 0.032*
Q1 -0.079 0.026*
Q2 0.364 0.082*
Q3 0.495 0.344**
Q4 0.437 0.079*
PUBLIC¥ 0.265 0.161**
Lambda 3.638 1.433**
Constant -6.582 6.943
Q5: reference group; ¥PRIVATE: reference group. *Significant at 0.01 ** Significant at 0.05. Adjusted R2: 0.292; F test: 43.54 
(p<0.001). Ramsey RESET Test=3.75(14)(p=0.08). Weisberg-Cook=40.68(14)( p<0.001).
5. Discussion
Concerning the household characteristics that affect OPS, this study partially confirms the results obtained by
previous research. While age and education level of household head and the size of the household are
associated with higher OPS, in the case of Chile we are not able to confirm the existence of a correlation
between the household’s OPS and the fact that the head of household is a man.
Our results confirmed that the Chilean health system is unfairly financed since mid-low and middle 
income families (quintiles 2, 3 and 4) had higher OPS related to NCD. The fact that households falling into in 
quintile 1 borne a lower OPS burden is probably related to the coverage provided by the public insurance to 
the poorest, which entails total exemption from user fees. As for the richest households (quintile 5), they can 
usually afford voluntary quotes or reinsurance premiums which guarantee them a wider coverage and/or the 
partial reimbursement of direct expenditure on health care. So, we are able to suggest that the prevalence of 
CNDs deepens inequalities in health financing, which means that reducing their prevalence would entail some 
improvement of the financial protection standards. On the other hand, it is possible that public health actions
aiming at prevent CNDs associated with lifestyle can help reduce these inequalities, an issue that remains 
outside the debate on fairness in health financing in Chile.
Findings from this paper reveal that adjusting copayment to income, as used in the public insurance, does 
not reduce out-of-pocket spending, which could be attributed to the following matters. First, the fact that the 
purchase of prescription drugs is not subsidized at all, which in the case of CNDs represents one of the 
greatest financial burdens both for individuals and their families. Second, the payment of voluntary quotes in 
the private system eventually entails the partial reimbursement of health professional services, hospital fees
and medicines. As expected, refunds depends on the amount of the extraordinary quotes and, ultimately, on 
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the household income.
Another interesting aspect that emerges from the results of this paper has to do with the achievements of
the Explicit Guarantees in Health Program (EGH). Since 2006, EGH has limited user fees for medical care 
according to households’ income†. Certainly, the financial guarantees provided by the program attempt to 
correct inequalities that, ultimately, are due to income differences. So EGH should be further refined until 
fully adjust the funding of the national health system to the ability-to-pay principle. To this end, it should be 
kept in mind that the height of coverage is as important as the breadth and depth of coverage. Therefore,
increasing the proportion of health care costs covered by the current program should not be dismissed. For 
example, adjusting payments to income level in the purchase of prescription drugs, which, in the case of 
chronic diseases, is a clear burdensome issue. Or, setting reference prices in order to avoid or reduce price 
difference between bioequivalent drugs. In any case, some previous steps will include promoting the 
development and use of generic drugs, as well as creating incentives for R&D activities carried on by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Finally, it seems necessary to insist that the prevention of chronic diseases associated 
with lifestyle would be an effective, efficient and equitable policy option. Certainly, this would require
interventions beyond the scope of the national health system, for instance, involving primary and secondary 
schools, ruling on food marketing and advertising, and encouraging behaviours that increase the stock of 
health in young populations in order to delay the onset of CDNs.
It must be reckoned some limitations of this study. First, our results are nationally representative but just at 
the urban level, so we are not able to provide any evidence concerning households in rural areas. Yet, it is in 
the urban areas where individuals are more exposed to unhealthy lifestyle patterns. Secondly, our results
ignore some relevant issues for public policy. For example, the available data neither enable us to describe
trends nor detect structural changes. It is not even possible to perform a comparative static analysis, because 
only CASEN09 offers reasonably disaggregated data on morbidity. Fortunately, in the coming years 
researchers will be able to perform such comparative analysis since new CASEN and EPF are currently being 
carried out. And, third, although the paper explains the effect of a set of CNDs on households’ health care 
spending, the model used does not give any information on the impact on the use of health care. For 
policymaking purposes, it would be fairly useful to know the share of households which put off the demand 
for these services because they are unable to bear the burden of health care costs; however, that is an answer 
we are not able to provide yet.
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